Causal Games

Definition

Causal Games are graphical models for strategic settings where agents’ choices and the environment’s causal mechanisms must both be represented. In Fox’s formulation, a causal game is a Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams model whose induced distribution is a causal Bayesian network once the agents’ policy profile is fixed.

Why It Matters

Many intervention questions in multi-agent systems ask what happens when other agents can observe the intervention and adapt. A model that only fixes a policy misses this strategic response, while a game model without causal semantics cannot cleanly distinguish prediction, intervention, and counterfactual queries.

Formalism / Key Objects

  • A causal game M=(G,theta) is a MAID such that, for every policy profile pi, the induced model with joint distribution Pr^pi(V) is a causal Bayesian network.
  • A structural causal game adds structural equations and exogenous variables so counterfactual queries can be evaluated.
  • Mechanised causal games add mechanism variables: Pi_D for decision rules and Theta_V for non-decision parameters.
  • Conditional queries quantify over rational outcomes:
  • Interventional queries similarly range over rational outcomes in the intervened game:

Connections

  • Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams provide the base graphical-game language.
  • Structural Equation Models provide the intervention and counterfactual semantics that causal games lift into strategic settings.
  • Causal Decision Making is adjacent when policy choice is evaluated by intervention effects; causal games add multiple rational agents and equilibrium dependence.
  • Strategic Reasoning supplies the equilibrium, subgame, rationality, and information-structure questions.
  • Stochastic Games are a different multi-agent sequential model; causal games emphasize graphical conditional independence and causal query semantics.

Common Confusions

  • A causal game is not just a game drawn as a graph; the graph must support causal interventions once policies are fixed.
  • A post-policy intervention is not the same as a pre-policy intervention. The latter lets agents adapt their decision rules to the changed game.
  • Causal games do not pick a unique equilibrium by default; queries often return sets or quantified claims over rational outcomes.

Key Sources