Causal Games
Definition
Causal Games are graphical models for strategic settings where agents’ choices and the environment’s causal mechanisms must both be represented. In Fox’s formulation, a causal game is a Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams model whose induced distribution is a causal Bayesian network once the agents’ policy profile is fixed.
Why It Matters
Many intervention questions in multi-agent systems ask what happens when other agents can observe the intervention and adapt. A model that only fixes a policy misses this strategic response, while a game model without causal semantics cannot cleanly distinguish prediction, intervention, and counterfactual queries.
Formalism / Key Objects
- A causal game
M=(G,theta)is a MAID such that, for every policy profilepi, the induced model with joint distributionPr^pi(V)is a causal Bayesian network. - A structural causal game adds structural equations and exogenous variables so counterfactual queries can be evaluated.
- Mechanised causal games add mechanism variables:
Pi_Dfor decision rules andTheta_Vfor non-decision parameters. - Conditional queries quantify over rational outcomes:
- Interventional queries similarly range over rational outcomes in the intervened game:
- Causal Game Intervention Semantics records the pre-policy/post-policy distinction and the counterfactual extension.
Connections
- Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams provide the base graphical-game language.
- Structural Equation Models provide the intervention and counterfactual semantics that causal games lift into strategic settings.
- Causal Decision Making is adjacent when policy choice is evaluated by intervention effects; causal games add multiple rational agents and equilibrium dependence.
- Strategic Reasoning supplies the equilibrium, subgame, rationality, and information-structure questions.
- Stochastic Games are a different multi-agent sequential model; causal games emphasize graphical conditional independence and causal query semantics.
Common Confusions
- A causal game is not just a game drawn as a graph; the graph must support causal interventions once policies are fixed.
- A post-policy intervention is not the same as a pre-policy intervention. The latter lets agents adapt their decision rules to the changed game.
- Causal games do not pick a unique equilibrium by default; queries often return sets or quantified claims over rational outcomes.