Multi-Value Responsibility Anticipation
Context
Parker2024 - Responsibility in a Multi-Value Strategic Setting studies agents choosing strategies when several possibly conflicting values are represented as finite-trace temporal formulas. The formal problem is to define responsibility sets that are not just pointwise blame labels but can guide strategy choice before a history is realized.
Formal Statement
A moral action system is nabla = (G, s_0, k, Omega), where G = (S, tau) is a multiagent transition system, s_0 is the start state, k is a finite horizon, and Omega = (Omega_1, ..., Omega_m) is a prioritized value base of LTLf formulas.
For value sets , define the priority-level score:
The comparison is lexicographic over priority levels: at the first priority level where the scores differ, the lower score is worse; if all scores tie, the sets are equivalent for comparison.
Given a strategy profile sigma, an agent i, and a unilateral alternative sigma_i', responsibility via strategy is:
Passive responsibility holds when such an alternative exists. Inexcusable passive responsibility further requires that no weak excuse exists: for negative responsibility , there is no possible strategy of the other agents under which the original sigma_i strictly outperforms the accusing alternative sigma_i'.
The paper’s main anticipation results are:
- passive responsibility-minimizing strategies are exactly regret-minimizing strategies;
- inexcusable passive responsibility-minimizing strategies are exactly non-dominated strategies;
- in the finite setting, there exists a strategy that is both regret-minimizing and non-dominated.
Derivation / Construction
- Evaluate each possible finite history with
Sat(H, Omega^+), whereOmega^+includes both the positive value formulas and their negations. - Compare value sets lexicographically by priority level, counting positive satisfied values against violated values.
- For an actual strategy profile, compare the actual play to the play induced by a unilateral alternative for agent
iwhile holding the other agents’ strategy fixed. - Use the set difference between actual and counterfactual satisfactions as the responsibility set.
- For anticipation, range over possible strategies of the other agents and take the worst single-history responsibility set rather than a union over histories.
- Identify passive-responsibility anticipation with the same worst-case relative-difference object used for symbolic regret.
- Identify inexcusable-responsibility anticipation with non-dominance because any asymmetrically dominated strategy lacks a weak excuse against the dominating alternative.
Implications
- The construction explains why multi-value responsibility needs set-level counterfactuals: avoidability must be assessed against one alternative history, not value by value across incompatible alternatives.
- Symbolic regret can produce explanation-friendly responsibility sets such as “the avoidable violation of value
omega_1” rather than only scalar regret. - The equivalence to non-dominance makes “having an excuse” a strategic property: a strategy is defensible when it is not asymmetrically weakly dominated.
- The framework is intentionally pessimistic because it assumes no probabilities over other agents’ strategies.
- The current formalism is finite and fully observable; compact strategy representations, heterogeneous values, and probabilistic beliefs are open extensions.